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Abstract—All-Against-One (AAO) games are a special class
of multi-player games where all players except one are in
direct conflict with the remaining player. In the case of Linear
Quadratic Differential (LQD) games, the AAO structure can be
used to describe a situation where all players except one are
trying to regulate the state of the system (drive it towards the
origin) while the opposing player is trying to de-regulate the
state (drive it away from the origin). Similar to the standard
LQD games, the closed-loop Nash strategies in the AAO LQD
games are expressed in terms of the solutions of a set of coupled
matrix Riccati differential equations. However, conditions for
existence of a solution to these equations are different and
more challenging in the AAO case. In this paper, we derive
conditions for existence, definiteness, and uniqueness of a solution
to these equations as well as conditions for boundedness of the
resulting state trajectory to ensure that the opposing player fails
in accomplishing its objective. Finally, we consider two options
for designing Nash strategies for the players and we illustrate the
results with an example of 3-against-1 pursuit-evasion differential
game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many large enterprises consist of a large number of interact-
ing subsystems. These systems often operate optimally when
all subsystems have a harmonious non-conflicting relationship
among themselves. When one subsystem decides to operate in
a manner that is not consistent with the others, the operation
of the entire enterprise suffers resulting in an adversarial
environment that affects not only the behavior of the dissenting
subsystem but also possibly the other conforming subsystems
as well. The disruption caused by one dissenting subsystem
may cause the remaining subsystems to act as a unified team
or it may result in the entire enterprise disintegrating and be-
having in a non-cooperative manner within itself. These types
of systems are best analyzed under the general framework
of game theory and more specifically using a new structure,
which we refer to as All-Against-One (AAO) games.
An example of AAO games, which has recently been
considered in the literature, is the multi-pursuer one-evader
pursuit evasion game [1]. In this game, a group of pursuers are
trying to catch one evader who is trying to escape. The solution
of these types of games involves the development of movement
strategies for the pursuers and evader that will conclude with
either the evader escaping or being captured. Except for this
multi-pursuers one-evader problem, game theory has mainly
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been concerned with independent non-cooperative players with
typically different objectives [2]–[8]. The Nash equilibrium
has been a very useful concept in defining strategies for
such games [9]. The AAO structure, however, provides a
unique configuration that allows for a more specific analysis
of problems where a group of players, all having different but
similar objectives, act against one opposing player.
In this paper, we focus on All-Against-One (AAO) Lin-
ear Quadratic Differential (LQD) game. Non-zero sum LQD
games have been studied for decades, beginning with the
seminal paper by Starr and Ho [4]. An M-player LQD game
is described by the system dynamics:
x˙ = Ax+
M∑
j=1
Bjuj , x(t0) = x0; (1)
and cost functions
Ji =
1
2
xᵀ(tf )Sifx(tf ) +
1
2
∫ tf
t0
[
xᵀQix+ u
ᵀ
iRiui
]
dt (2)
for i = 1, 2, ...,M , where x is the state vector and u1 through
uM are the players’ control vectors. Matrices A, Bi, Qi and
Ri are all bounded and of proper dimensions and Sif ≥ 0
and Qi ≥ 0 are symmetric positive semi-definite matrices and
Ri > 0 is symmetric positive definite for i = 1, 2, ...,M . For
simplicity of notation and derivations, we have not included
the input cross-coupling terms in the cost functions.
The AAO LQD game is described by the same dynamics
as in (1) and cost functions as in (2) except that now S1f < 0
and Q1 < 0 are symmetric negative definite matrices while
Sif ≥ 0 and Qi ≥ 0 for i = 2, 3, ...,M remain as before.
This formulation puts players 2, . . . ,M directly in conflict
with player 1. That is, while players 2 through M are trying
to regulate the state of the system by minimizing its deviation
from the origin as in the standard LQD game, player 1 is
now trying to de-regulate (or de-stabilize) the system by
maximizing the deviation of the state from the origin. Because
of this, existence results of the closed-loop Nash strategies for
players in the standard LQD game [10]–[13] do not apply to
the AAO games.
In this paper, we derive conditions for existence, definite-
ness, and uniqueness of the closed-loop Nash strategies in
AAO LQD games as well as boundedness of the resulting state
trajectory. The paper is organized as follows: In section II, we
define the problem and derive new conditions for existence
and definiteness of the closed-loop Nash strategies as well as
sufficient conditions for the exponential boundedness of the
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
10
29
2v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
7 F
eb
 20
19
resulting state trajectory. One advantage of the AAO structure
is that it provides for an additional option for the group of
players to consider forming a cooperative team against the
opposing player in an attempt to improve their collective
performance. In section III, we discuss the Team-Nash strategy
for the group of players in designing their strategies against the
opposing player as an alternative option to the Nash strategy
among all players. In section IV, we present an illustrative
example of three-pursuers one-evader, as a three-against-one
game that considers different pursuit-evasion scenarios and
shows simulation results for both pursuers’ strategies when
the evader is using a strategy that yields a Nash equilibrium
in each case. Concluding remarks are presented in section V.
A. Notation
The real maximum (minimum) eigenvalue of a symmetric
n × n matrix Q(t) at each instant of time t is denoted
by λmaxQ (t) (λ
min
Q (t)). The maximal (minimal) eigenvalue
of the same matrix Q(t) over the interval [t0, tf ] is a real
constant defined as λ¯Q , maxt∈[t0,tf ] λmaxQ (t) (λQ ,
mint∈[t0,tf ] λ
min
Q (t)). The Euclidean norm of a vector v is
denoted by ‖v‖. The Frobenius norm of a matrix S is defined
as ‖S‖F = tr{SSᵀ} where tr{.} is the trace of a matrix.
Function blkdiag{Q1, . . . , Qm} constructs a larger matrix
with diagonal blocks consist of matrices Qi. Matrix In is the
identity matrix of dimension n, vector 1n denotes a vector
of dimension n with all entries equal to 1, vector ei is the
standard basis for Rn in the ith direction and ⊗ indicates the
Kronecker product. The set of positive (negative) semi-definite
Rn×n matrices is denote by Rn×n+ (R
n×n
− ) and
∏
indicates
the Cartesian product of sets.
We use the notation Iδtf to denote a subset of [t0, tf ] defined
as Iδtf = [tf − δ, tf ] ⊆ [t0, tf ] where δ is arbitrary and
0 < δ ≤ tf − t0.
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF CLOSED-LOOP NASH
STRATEGIES IN AAO LQD GAMES
It is well known [4] that the closed-loop Nash strategies for
the game described by (1) and (2) are of the form
u∗i = −R−1i Bᵀi Six (3)
for i = 1, 2, ...,M , where Si’s satisfy the following M-coupled
differential Riccati equations:
S˙i + SiA+A
ᵀSi +Qi + SiHiSi
−
M∑
j=1
(
SiHjSj + SjHjSi
)
= 0, (4)
with boundary conditions Si(tf ) = Sif , and Hi = BiR−1i B
ᵀ
i .
The resulting system trajectory will satisfy
x˙ = Ax (5)
where
A , A−
M∑
j=1
HjSj . (6)
The above characterization (and all the subsequent analysis)
related to the AAO games can be easily extended if the input
cross-coupling terms were presented in the cost functions (2).
A. Definiteness of AAO Solutions
For the standard LQD game where Sif ≥ 0 and Qi ≥ 0
for i = 1, 2, ...,M , it is well known [13] that all matrices
satisfying (4) will be positive semidefinite. That is, Si(t) ≥ 0
for t ∈ [t0, tf ] and for i = 1, 2, ...,M . Because S1f < 0 and
Q1 < 0 in the AAO games this result is no longer valid for
these games. The following theorem provides the equivalent
result for the AAO LQD formulation.
Theorem 1. For the AAO game, let {Si(t), i = 1, · · · ,M}
satisfy (4) over any interval Iδtf ⊆ [t0, tf ], then for all t ∈ Iδtf
we have S1(t) < 0 and Si(t) ≥ 0 for i = 2, 3, ...,M .
Proof. Let λmaxS1 (t) and v(t) be the maximum eigenvalue and
corresponding unit eigenvector of S1(t). The matrix S1(t)
is piecewise continuously differentiable and symmetric for
t ∈ Iδtf but not necessarily analytic. Thus, its eigenvectors (or
eigenspaces) are not necessarily continuous (therefore not dif-
ferentiable) 1. Continuity (differentiability) of the eigenvectors
of S1(t) requires S1(t) to be holomorphic (analytic) (see [14],
Theorem 1.10). However, in our case we only have continuity
of S1(t) and thus we cannot differentiate v(t). Instead, we
can show [see [13], Theorem 3.6.1] that λmaxS1 (t) is not only
continuous but also differentiable almost everywhere, and at
any point that it is differentiable its derivative satisfies
d
dt
λmaxS1 (t) =v
ᵀ(t)S˙1v(t)
=− vᵀ(t) (S1A+AᵀS1 + S1H1S1) v(t)
+
M∑
j=1
(vᵀ(t)S1HjSjv(t) + vᵀ(t)SjHjS1v(t))
− vᵀ(t)Q1v(t)
which can be simplified as
d
dt
λmaxS1 (t) = λ
max
S1 (t)v
ᵀ(t)
[
−A−Aᵀ − λmaxS1 (t)H1
+
M∑
j=1
(
HjSj + SjHj
)]
v(t)− vᵀ(t)Q1v(t).
Now for sufficiently small λmaxS1 (t) we have
d
dt
λmaxS1 (t) ≈ −vᵀ(t)Q1v(t) > 0 (7)
since Q1 < 0. Given that S1(tf ) = S1f < 0, we know
λmaxS1 (tf ) < 0 and hence by (7) and the continuity of λ
max
S1
(t),
the maximal eigenvalue λmaxS1 (t) < 0 for all t ∈ Iδtf . This
proves that λmaxS1 (t) starts from a negative value at t = tf
and stays negative as it evolves backward in time. Noting that
λmaxS1 (t) is the maximum eigenvalue of S1(t), this proves that
1An example of such a matrix is presented in [Kato 14, p. 111]
S1(t) < 0 for all t ∈ Iδtf . Now, for i = 2, 3...,M , let A be as
defined in (6) then (4) can be written as
S˙i + SiA+A
ᵀ
Si +Qi + SiHiSi = 0
with Si(tf ) = Sif . Let Ψ(t, τ) be the state transition matrix
of −Aᵀ(t). It is known that for t, τ ∈ Iδtf ,
∂Ψ(t, τ)
∂t
= −Aᵀ(t)Ψ(t, τ), Ψ(τ, τ) = In; (8)
Then Si(t) will satisfy
Si(t) = Ψ(t, tf )Si(tf )Ψ
ᵀ(t, tf )
+
∫ tf
t
Ψ(t, τ)[Qi + SiHiSi]Ψ
ᵀ(t, τ)dτ. (9)
Now, since Si(tf ) ≥ 0, Qi ≥ 0 and Ri > 0 for i = 2, 3...,M ,
it follows from (9) that for all t ∈ Iδtf we have Si(t) ≥ 0 for
i = 2, 3, ...,M . This completes the proof.
B. Existence of AAO Solutions
Sufficient conditions for existence of Si(t) matrices satis-
fying (4) have been derived in [12] and [13] only for an LQD
game consisting of two players and with all positive definite
weight matrices (i.e. S1f > 0, S2f > 0, Q1 > 0 and Q2 > 0).
Clearly, in the AAO formulation these conditions do not apply
since there is one player with negative definite weight matrices
(S1f < 0 and Q1 < 0). The next theorem provides sufficient
conditions for existence of set of Si(t) matrices satisfying (4)
for an M-player AAO game. We first state the following two
Lemmas that are needed in the proof of theorem 2.
Lemma 1. Let Y (t) be a matrix that satisfies
Y˙ (t) ≤ −Y (t)A−AᵀY (t), Y (tf ) = 0 (10)
over the interval Iδtf ⊆ [t0, tf ]. Then it follows that Y (t) ≥ 0,
for all t ∈ Iδtf .
Proof. Define Z(t, τ) = Φᵀ(t, τ)Y (t)Φ(t, τ) while Φ(t, τ)
for all t, τ ∈ Iδtf is defined as follows
∂Φ(t, τ)
∂t
= AΦ(t, τ), Φ(τ, τ) = In.
Since Y (tf ) = 0 and Φ(t, τ) is bounded due to A being
bounded, then Z(tf , τ) = 0 for all τ ∈ Iδtf . Also,
∂Z(t, τ)
∂t
= Φᵀ(t, τ)
[
AᵀY + Y˙ + Y A
]
Φ(t, τ) ≤ 0
where Y is a solution of (10). Now if we define g(t, τ, v) =
vᵀZ(t, τ)v for all t, τ ∈ Iδtf and v ∈ Rn then ∂∂tg(t, τ, v) ≤ 0
for all t ∈ Iδtf . Therefore the mean value theorem yields
0 ≤ g(t1, τ, v)− g(t2, τ, v) = vᵀ[Z(t1, τ)− Z(t2, τ)]v
for all t1, t2 ∈ Iδtf where t1 ≤ t2, and as a result Z(t1, τ) ≥
Z(t2, τ). We conclude that Z(t, τ) ≥ Z(tf , τ) = 0 for all
t, τ ∈ Iδtf . Finally choosing τ = t yields Y (t) ≥ 0 for all
t ∈ Iδtf .
Now, for a bounded symmetric matrix Q, define the follow-
ing map from
∏M
1 Rn×n to Rn×n as follows
RQ(W1, ...,WM ) , Q+W1H1W1 −
M∑
i=2
WiHiWi
+
(
−W1+
M∑
i=2
Wi
) M∑
j=1
HjWj+
M∑
j=1
WjHj
(
−W1+
M∑
i=2
Wi
)
(11)
and let LQ(t) be the unique solution of following terminal
value linear differential equation
L˙Q(t) = −LQ(t)A−AᵀLQ(t)−
(
Q−Q1+
M∑
i=2
Qi
)
(12)
with boundary condition LQ(tf ) = −S1f +
∑M
i=2 Sif . The
following lemma provides the condition under which solutions
Si(t) of (4) stay in the following bounded set:
E , {S ∈ Rn×n|S = Sᵀ, ‖S‖F ≤ lq} (13)
where lq = sup
t∈[t0,tf ]
‖LQ(t)‖F . We also define the space χ ,
C
(
Iδtf ,
∏M
1 E
)
. Space χ is complete under the norm2
‖(S1, . . . , SM )‖χ , sup
t∈Iδtf
M∑
j=1
‖Sj‖F . (14)
This lemma enables us to establish Theorem 2 on the
existence of a set of solutions Si(t) of (4).
Lemma 2. For the AAO game, every solution set {Si(t), i =
1, 2, ...,M} satisfying (4) over any interval Iδtf ⊆ [t0, tf ] stays
within E for all t ∈ Iδtf ⊆ [t0, tf ] provided that RQ maps
Rn×n− × (
∏M
2 R
n×n
+ ) into R
n×n
+ .
Proof. Since LQ(t) satisfies the linear differential equation
(12) and matrices A, Q and Qi are bounded, then (by
Gronwall’s Lemma [15] and Theorem 1.1.5 in [13]) LQ(t)
exists for all t ∈ [t0, tf ]. Therefore, lq exists and the set E in
(13) is well-defined and bounded. Next, we prove that
0 < −S1(t) +
M∑
i=2
Si(t) ≤ LQ(t) (15)
The left inequality of (15) follows from Theorem 1. Now for
the right inequality, define
Y (t) , LQ(t) + S1(t)−
M∑
i=2
Si(t)
then after considerable algebraic manipulations (4), (11) and
(12) yield
Y˙ = −Y A−AᵀY −RQ(S1, ..., SM )
2Since it is a closed subset of C
(
Iδtf ,
∏M
1 Rn×n
)
which is a Banach
space under the same norm.
with boundary condition Y (tf ) = 0. Thus
Y˙ ≤ −Y A−AᵀY
over Iδtf ⊆ [t0, tf ] provided that RQ(S1, ..., SM ) ≥ 0
which follows by the assumption and Theorem 1. Therefore,
according to Lemma 1 we conclude Y (t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ Iδtf .
Therefore, inequality (15) is proved for all t ∈ Iδtf . Since
according to Theorem 1, −S1(t) > 0 and Si(t) ≥ 0 for
i = 2, 3, . . . ,M , it follows that for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M and for
all t ∈ Iδtf
‖Si(t)‖F =tr{Si(t)Sᵀi (t)}
≤tr{LQ(t)LᵀQ(t)}
≤lq (16)
This completes the proof.
Theorem 2. For the AAO game, there exists a unique solution
set {Si(t), i = 1, 2, ...,M} satisfying (4) for all t ∈ [t0, tf ]
provided that RQ maps Rn×n− × (
∏M
2 R
n×n
+ ) into R
n×n
+ .
Proof. The Riccati differential equations in (4) are equivalent
to the following integral equations for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M ,
Si(t) = Sif +
∫ tf
t
fi(τ, S1, . . . , SM )dτ (17)
where
fi , SiA+AᵀSi+Qi−SiHiSi−
M∑
j=1,j 6=i
(
SiHjSj+SjHjSi
)
.
Functions fi are locally Lipschitz for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M because
‖∆fi‖F = ‖fi(t, S1, . . . , SM )− fi(t, S∗1 , . . . , S∗M )‖F
=‖(Si − S∗i )A+Aᵀ(Si − S∗i )
− SiHi(Si − S∗i )− (Si − S∗i )HiS∗i
−
M∑
j=1,j 6=i
(
(Si − S∗i )HjSj + S∗jHj(Si − S∗i )
+ S∗iHj(Sj − S∗j ) + (Sj − S∗j )HjSi
)
‖F
≤‖Si − S∗i ‖F
{
2 ‖A‖F
+ h
M∑
j=1
(
‖Sj‖F +
∥∥S∗j ∥∥F )}
+
M∑
j=1,j 6=i
∥∥Sj − S∗j ∥∥F {h( ‖S∗i ‖F + ‖Si‖F )}
≤Kc
M∑
j=1
∥∥Sj − S∗j ∥∥F (18)
where
Kc = 2 ‖A‖F + h
M∑
j=1
(
‖Sj‖F +
∥∥S∗j ∥∥F ) (19)
and h = max
1≤i≤M
‖Hi‖F . It follows that, Kc is bounded for all
Si, S
∗
i ∈ E as follows
sup
t∈Iδtf
Kc ≤ 2 sup
t∈[t0,tf ]
‖A‖F + 2Mh lq , Kc (20)
for some δ > 0 to be determined later and denoted as δ̂
according to the following process.
Process: Noting from (13) that the boundary condition
Sif ∈ E for i = 1, 2 . . . ,M . Next, operator T : χ → χ is
defined as follows:
T (S1, . . . , SM )(t) ,{(
S1f +
∫ tf
t
f1dτ
)
, . . . ,
(
SMf +
∫ tf
t
fMdτ
)}
. (21)
Operator T is a contraction mapping for δ = δ̂ = 1
2MKc
, since
‖∆T ‖χ =
∥∥T (S1, . . . , SM )(t) − T (S∗1 , . . . , S∗M )(t)∥∥χ
=
∥∥∥∥{∫ tf
t
∆f1dτ , . . . ,
∫ tf
t
∆fMdτ
}∥∥∥∥
χ
= sup
t∈I δ̂tf
M∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥∫ tf
t
∆fidτ
∥∥∥∥
F
≤ sup
t∈I δ̂tf
M∑
i=1
∫ tf
t
‖∆fi‖F dτ
≤δ̂M sup
t∈I δ̂tf
‖∆fi‖F
≤δ̂MKc ‖(S1, . . . , SM )− (S∗1 , . . . , S∗M )‖χ
=
1
2
‖(S1, . . . , SM )− (S∗1 , . . . , S∗M )‖χ (22)
for all (S1, . . . , SM ), (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
M ) ∈ χ. By the contraction
mapping theorem [16], there exists a unique solution set
{Si(t), i = 1, 2, ...,M} of (4) over the interval [tf − δ̂, tf ].
Furthermore, by the assumption and Theorem 1 it follows that
RQ(S1, ..., SM ) ≥ 0 over I δ̂tf , and by applying Lemma 2
on Si(t) over I δ̂tf , we conclude that Si(tf − δ̂) ∈ E for
i = 1, 2, ...,M .
Now, we extend the local existence property established
using the above process to the entire interval [t0, tf ] as follows.
We repeat the same process for the Riccati equations in (4)
over the interval I δ̂
tf−δ̂ = [tf −2δ̂, tf − δ̂] with Si(tf − δ̂) ∈ E
as the new boundary condition. By recalling that the Lipschitz
condition (18) holds and defining a contraction mapping as
in (21) over a new space χ defined over the new interval
I δ̂
tf−δ̂ = [tf − 2δ̂, tf − δ̂], it can be similarly shown that
Si(t) exist over this interval and that based on Lemma 2
Si(tf − 2δ̂) ∈ E . Finally, this process can be repeated over
successive intervals I δ̂
tf−kδ̂ = [tf − kδ̂, tf − (k − 1)δ̂] for
k = 1, 2, . . . . The initial time t0 will be reached since at
every iteration δ̂ = 1
2MKc
> 0 and Kc is a uniform bound on
E as shown in (20). This ends the proof.
Remark 1. For the existence of AAO solutions note that:
1) The purpose of the symmetric matrix Q appearing in (12)
and Theorem 2 is to establish the upper bound LQ(t)
described in (13).
2) It can be shown that the condition
RQ
(
Rn×n− × (
∏M
2 R
n×n
+ )
)
⊂ Rn×n+ is fulfilled
for several sub-classes of AAO games, for which explicit
conditions on existence of a solution can be determined
in terms of weighting matrices Qi and Sif . One such
subclass is illustrated in Corollary 2.1.
Before providing the explicit conditions of existence, we
provide the following lemma which is used in the proof of
the next corollary and Theorem 3.
Lemma 3. For the AAO game, if Q1 +
∑M
i=2Qi > 0 and
S1f +
∑M
i=2 Sif > 0, then for every solution set {Si(t), i =
1, 2, ...,M} satisfying (4) over any interval Iδtf ⊆ [t0, tf ], it
follows that P (t) > 0, for all t ∈ Iδtf .
Proof. For every solution set {Si(t), i = 1, 2, ...,M} that
satisfies (4), let
P (t) = S1(t) +
M∑
i=2
Si(t) (23)
then it would satisfy the following
P˙ +PA+A
ᵀ
P +Q1 +
M∑
i=2
Qi +S1H1S1 +
M∑
i=2
SiHiSi = 0;
(24)
with boundary condition P (tf ) = S1f +
∑M
i=2 Sif . Then P (t)
will satisfy
P (t) = Ψ(t, tf )P (tf )Ψ
ᵀ(t, tf ) +
∫ tf
t
Ψ(t, τ)
[
Q1
+
M∑
i=2
Qi + S1H1S1 +
M∑
i=2
SiHiSi
]
Ψᵀ(t, τ)dτ. (25)
where Ψ(t, τ) is as in (8). Since matrices Ri > 0 for i =
1, 2, . . . ,M , this yields Hi ≥ 0, and from the hypothesis of
the lemma and (25), it follows that P (t) > 0 for all t ∈ Iδtf .
This completes the proof.
Corollary 2.1. Consider an AAO game with diagonal matrices
A, Bi, Sif , Qi and Ri for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M . If Q1+
∑M
i=2Qi >
0, S1f +
∑M
i=2 Sif > 0, and H1 ≤ Hi for i = 2, 3, . . . ,M ,
then RQ maps Rn×n− ×(
∏M
2 R
n×n
+ ) into R
n×n
+ for any Q ≥ 0
and thus a unique solution set {Si(t), i = 1, 2, ...,M} of (4)
exists for all t ∈ [t0, tf ].
Proof. See Appendix A.
C. Boundedness of the System Trajectory
The next theorem provides a sufficient condition for the
system trajectory to be exponentially bounded. Specifically, if
the final time is large enough, then the state vector of the sys-
tem is guaranteed to end up in a small hyper-ball. Essentially,
this theorem provides conditions that guarantee that opposing
player cannot accomplish its goal of de-stabilizing the system.
Theorem 3. For an AAO game with a solution set {Si(t), i =
1, · · · ,M} satisfying (4), if Q1 +
∑M
i=2Qi > 0 and S1f +∑M
i=2 Sif > 0, then the state trajectory in (5) will be
exponentially bounded. In particular, for any small r > 0,
it follows ‖x(tf )‖ ≤ r provided that
tf − t0 ≥ λP
λQ̂
{
2 ln
(‖x0‖
r
)
+ ln
(
λP
λP
)}
.
Proof. Let
V (t) = xᵀ(t)P (t)x(t), (26)
where the state vector x(t) is defined in (1) and P (t) is as in
(23). Matrix P (t) is positive definite for all t based on Lemma
3. Then, using (5) and (24) it follows that
V˙ (t) = −xᵀ
(
M∑
i=1
(Qi + SiHiSi)
)
x (27)
Since, Q1 +
∑M
i=2Qi > 0 and Hi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M it
follows that V˙ (t) < 0 which yields a decaying dynamics for
the system. Now if we define Q̂ =
∑M
i=1Qi, then it follows
that
V˙ ≤ −xᵀQ̂x ≤ −λQ̂
λP
V
Then one can conclude that
V (t) ≤ V (t0) exp
{
−λQ̂
λP
(t− t0)
}
which is an exponential decaying bound for the system. Also,
we can conclude that(‖x(t)‖
‖x0‖
)2
≤ λP
λP
exp
{
−λQ̂
λP
(t− t0)
}
.
Finally, by rearranging the terms, in order to achieve
‖x(tf )‖ ≤ r, tf − t0 should be greater than the expression
provided in the theorem. This ends the proof.
III. TWO OPTIONS FOR THE GROUP OF PLAYERS
The AAO game offers several possible options for the M−1
players in the group. In this paper we consider only two as
illustrated in Figure 1. The first option is for the players in the
group to ignore the fact that they have similar cost functions
and decide to design Nash strategies among themselves as
well as the opposing player [4]. The second option, which
intuitively appears to be the better choice, is for the players
in the group to form a team and cooperate among themselves
in designing a collective Nash strategy against the remaining
player [17]. However, being restricted to operate within the
framework of the team, although beneficial to the entire group,
may or may not be beneficial to each player, and as a result
may be beneficial to the opposing player. We will refer to
the first option as the Nash solution and to the second as the
Team-Nash solution. The Nash strategies of the first option
are determined as described in (3) and (4). The Team-Nash
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(a)
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P2 P3
PM−1
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.....
Team
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Fig. 1. All-against-one game (a) Nash Strategies: Nash among all players, (b)
Team-Nash Strategies: Nash between Player 1 and team of Players 2,3,...,M.
strategies of the second option are determined by first forming
a team cost function as a convex combination of the individual
cost functions of the M − 1 players in the group. That is
JT =
M−1∑
i=1
αiJi+1 (28)
where αi > 0,
∑M−1
i=1 αi = 1 and Ji for i = 2, ...,M as they
are defined in (2). The weight αi can be viewed as the relative
contribution of Player i+ 1 to the team. So the cost function
for the team of players becomes
JT =
1
2
xᵀ(tf )STfx(tf ) +
1
2
∫ tf
t0
[xᵀQTx+ u
ᵀ
TRTuT ] dt
(29)
where
STf =
M−1∑
i=1
αiS(i+1)f , (30)
QT =
M−1∑
i=1
αiQi+1, (31)
RT = blkdiag{α1R2, α2R3, . . . , αM−1RM}. (32)
The opposing player’s cost function stays the same as J1. Also,
the control inputs of the players in the group are combined as
one vector but it will be reallocated to each player later at the
implementation stage. Consequently, the system dynamics of
(1) can be reorganized as follows
x˙ = Ax+B1u1 +BTuT (33)
where uT = [u
ᵀ
2 , u
ᵀ
3 , ..., u
ᵀ
M ]
ᵀ is the team control vector.
The system dynamics (33) and cost functions JT and J1
form a 2-player LQD game. The closed-loop Nash strategies
can be obtained from (3) as follows{
u∗1 = −R−11 Bᵀ1S1x
u∗T = −R−1T BᵀTSTx
(34)
where the matrices ST and S1 are the solutions to the
following coupled differential Riccati equations
S˙1 + S1A+A
ᵀS1 +Q1 − S1H1S1
− S1HTST − STHTS1 = 0, (35)
S˙T + STA+A
ᵀST +QT − STHTST
− STH1S1 − S1H1ST = 0, (36)
where HT = BTR−1T B
ᵀ
T and with boundary conditions
S1(tf ) = S1f and ST (tf ) = STf . Note that assigning different
values of αi will yield different teams with different strengths
and weaknesses, and correspondingly different Nash solutions.
Also, note that even though this game is solved as a 2-player
LQD game, upon implementation the controls are reallocated
to each player and the game remains as a multi-player game.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
To illustrate the AAO framework, we consider a simple
3-against-1 pursuit evasion game on a planar surface. The
evader, player 1, is trying to escape from three pursuers
(players 2, 3 and 4) by maximizing its weighted distance from
them while the pursuers are trying to capture the evader by
minimizing these distances. We consider a capture radius of
0.1, meaning that if the evader is within a distance of 0.1
from any of the pursuers it is considered as captured. The
dynamics of the system follows (1). The state vector x ∈ R6
is the combined three displacement vectors of dimension 2
each, which connects the evader E to pursuers P1, P2 and P3,
respectively. To control the velocities of the players on the
plane, the open-loop dynamic matrix is assumed to be A = 0.
The input matrix for the evader is B1 = 13 ⊗ I2 and for
the pursuers are Bi = −ei−1 ⊗ I2 for i = 2, 3, 4. Also, the
combined input matrix of the pursuers as a team can be written
as BT = −I3 ⊗ I2. We consider a final time tf = 10 (which
is relatively long for the given system dynamics). Each player
tries to minimize the corresponding cost function as stated in
(2). We assume that the evader’s parameters in its cost function
are as follows
S1f = −18I3 ⊗ I2, Q1 = −6I3 ⊗ I2, R1 = I2
and the pursuers’ parameters in their cost functions are as
follows
S2f = I3 ⊗ I2, Q2 = 0.5I3 ⊗ I2, R2 = 150I2,
S3f = I3 ⊗ I2, Q3 = 0.5I3 ⊗ I2, R3 = 150I2,
S4f = 16.25I3 ⊗ I2, Q4 = 5.25I3 ⊗ I2, R4 = 150I2.
Additionally, for the Team-Nash strategies we arbitrarily
chose [α1 α2 α3] = [0.3 0.3 0.3] representing equal
contributions by all pursuers. The initial positions of the
players are such that the initial state vector is x0 =[
2 13 7 9 −10 14]ᵀ. The resulting state variables
(which are the combined three displacement vectors that
connect the three pursuers to the evader) for the Nash and
Team-Nash strategies are plotted vs time in Figures 2a and 3a
respectively. The x-y coordinates of the players’ movement for
both strategies are shown in Figures 2b and 3b respectively.
Finally, the distances of pursuers to the evader for the Nash
and Team-Nash strategies are plotted vs time in Figures 2c
and 3c respectively.
For the Nash strategies in Figure 2, the conditions of
Theorem 3 are satisfied since
Q1 +
4∑
j=2
Qj = (−6 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 5.25)I3 ⊗ I2 > 0
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Fig. 2. Example - Nash Strategies: (a) state variables versus time, (b) x-y
coordinates of players’ trajectories and (c) distances between the pursuers P1,
P2 and P3, and the evader E.
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Fig. 3. Example - Team-Nash Strategies: (a) state variables versus time, (b)
x-y coordinates of players’ trajectories and (c) distances between the pursuers
P1, P2 and P3, and the evader E.
S1f +
4∑
j=2
Sjf = (−18 + 1 + 1 + 16.25)I3 ⊗ I2 > 0
Consequently, according to Theorem 3 the exponential
boundedness of the system is guaranteed regardless of the
initial position of the players. For the given tf the pursuers
are able to capture the evader before final time of the game.
For the Team-Nash strategies in Figure 3, the conditions of
Theorem 3 are not satisfied since
Q1 +QT = (−6 + 2.08)I3 ⊗ I2 < 0
S1f + STf = (−18 + 6.08)I3 ⊗ I2 < 0.
Consequently, the exponential boundedness of system is not
guaranteed. In this case as can be seen in Figures 3, the evader
was able to keep the state vector of the system away from
the origin and as a result escape. In terms of accomplishing
their objectives, the pursuers appear to have done a better
job in using the Nash strategies compared to the Team-Nash
strategies. As mentioned earlier this may be due to the fact
that in the Nash strategies the pursuers are completely free to
act independently while in the Team-Nash they are constraint
to act cooperatively within the team structure.
TABLE I
PURSUERS DISTANCES TO THE EVADER FOR DIFFERENT FINAL TIME
tf = 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 14.00
Pu
rs
ue
rs
’
D
is
ta
nc
es
to
E
va
de
r
at
t f
N
as
h
P1 8.25 1.42 0.25 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
P2 9.59 2.22 0.40 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
P3 7.19 1.29 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Te
am
-N
as
h P1 1.90 1.34 0.91 0.61 0.41 0.27 0.18
P2 5.94 4.18 2.85 1.92 1.28 0.85 0.57
P3 7.39 5.21 3.55 2.38 1.59 1.06 0.70
Table I shows the distances between the pursuers and the
evader for different values of tf increasing from 2 to 14 and for
the two strategy options discussed. As it is clear from the table
for the Nash strategy, the evader could have been captured if
the final time were tf = 8 instead of tf = 10 since its distance
from all pursuers are within the capture radius 0.1 at tf = 8.
On the other hand for the Team-Nash strategy, it is clear that
even for a final time tf = 14 the pursuers are still further away
from the evader and none of them is within the capture radius.
However, if tf were extended to 18, then the simulation would
show the distance between the pursuer (P1) and the evader at
this final time is 0.08 which is within the capture radius and
thus the evader will be captured.
V. CONCLUSION
The current literature on linear quadratic non-zero-sum
differential games has emphasized a structure in which all
players are constrained to have non-negative definite state
weight matrices in their cost functions. This structure does
not consider games where one or more players have cost
functions that do not satisfy this constraint. In this paper,
we considered games where one of the players has an cost
function with negative definite state weight matrices making
this player in direct conflict with the remaining players. These
types of games are very useful in analyzing conflict situations
in which one player wants to maximize the deviation of the
state from the origin (i.e. de-stabilize the system) while the
others are trying to regulate the state in the standard sense.
We referred to these types of games as All-Against-One. In
this paper, we derived new conditions that guarantee existence,
definiteness and uniqueness of the closed-loop Nash strategies
as well as boundedness of the resulting state trajectory. We
also considered the Nash and Team-Nash strategies as possible
options for the group of the players. As an illustrative example,
we simulated a three-pursuer one-evader pursuit evasion game
and determined both close-loop Nash and Team-Nash strate-
gies for the players and resulting trajectories. We also applied
our results to derive conditions for which the evader will be
captured under each case. In the case of the Nash strategies,
we also showed that as the final time increased the distances
between the pursuers and the evader became smaller, making
it more difficult for the evader to escape.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2.1
First, we prove that RQ maps Rn×n− × (
∏M
2 R
n×n
+ ) into
Rn×n+ or equivalently RQ(W1, ...,WM ) is positive semi-
definite for every collection {Wi(t), i = 1, 2, ...,M} such that
W1 ≤ 0 and Wi ≥ 0 for i = 2, . . . ,M , and for any Q ≥ 0.
Suppose that all matrices are diagonal, thus, they commute and
we can simplify and bound RQ(W1, ...,WM ) from below as
follows
RQ =Q+H1W 21 −
M∑
i=2
HiW
2
i − 2
M∑
j=1
HjW1Wj
+ 2
M∑
i=2
M∑
j=1
HjWiWj
=Q−H1W 21 −
M∑
i=2
HiW
2
i + 2
M∑
j=2
(H1 −Hj)W1Wj
+ 2
M∑
i=2
M∑
j=2
HjWiWj
=Q−H1W 21 +
M∑
i=2
HiW
2
i + 2
M∑
j=2
(H1 −Hj)W1Wj
+ 2
M∑
i,j=2
i6=j
HjWiWj
≥−H1W 21 +
M∑
i=2
HiW
2
i + 2
M∑
i,j=2
i 6=j
HjWiWj (37)
≥H1
(
−W 21 +
M∑
i=2
W 2i +
M∑
i,j=2
i 6=j
2WiWj
)
(38)
=H1
(
−W 21 +
( M∑
i=2
Wi
)2)
=H1
(
−W1 +
M∑
i=2
Wi
)(
W1 +
M∑
i=2
Wi
)
(39)
First, Inequalities (37) and (38) are due to H1 ≤ Hi. Second,
all given matrices are assumed to be diagonal which result
in all Si (solutions of (4)) to be diagonal and has the same
definiteness as Wi by Theorem 1. Third, H1 ≥ 0, Theorem
1 and Lemma 3 together yield that S1 +
∑M
i=2 Si ≥ 0 and
therefore by (39) it follows thatRQ(S1, . . . , SM ) ≥ 0. Finally,
similar argument as in Theorem 2 results in existence of Si
for all t ∈ [t0, tf ].
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